What is the meaning of language expressions and how to compute or calculate it? In this paper, we give an answer to this question by analysing the meanings of aspects and tenses in natural languages inside the formal model of an grammar of applicative, cognitive and enunciative operations , using the applicative formalism, functional types of categorial grammars and combinatory logic . In the enunciative theory and following , an utterance can be decomposed into two components: a modus and a (...) dictum . In GRACE, the modus is a complex operator applied to a proposition and is generated from more elementary operators of the categories of tense, aspect, and modality. The dictum is a proposition generated by a predicative relation. In this way, we can attribute a semantic meaning to different grammatical aspecto-temporal operators. The applicative expressions of CL can be easily translated into a functional programming language such as HASKELL or CAML. (shrink)

From a logical viewpoint, object is never defined, even by a negative definition. This paper is a theoretical contribution about object using a new constructivist logical approach called Logic of Determination of Objects founded on a basic operation, called determination. This new logic takes into account cognitive problems such as the inheritance of properties by non typical occurrences or by indeterminate atypical objects in opposition to prototypes that are typical completely determinate objects. We show how extensional classes, intensions, more and (...) less determined objects, more or less typical representatives of a concept and prototypes are defined and organized, using a determination operation that constructs a class of indeterminate objects from an object representation of a concept called typical object. (shrink)

Feminism and Ecological Communities presents a bold and passionate rethinking of teh ecofeminist movement. It is one of the first books to acknowledge the importance of postmodern feminist arguments against ecofeminism whilst persuasively preseenting a strong new case for econolocal feminism. Chris J.Cuomo first traces the emergence of ecofeminism from the ecological and feminist movements before clearly discussing the weaknesses of some ecofeminist positions. Exploring the dualisms of nature/culture and masculing/feminine that are the bulwark of many contemporary ecofeminist positions and (...) questioning traditional traditional feminist analyses of gender and caring, Feminism and Ecological Communities asks whether women are essentially closer to nature than men and how we ought to link the oppression of women, people of colour, and other subjugated groups to the degradation of nature. Chris J.Cuomo addresses these key issues by drawing on recent work in feminist ethics as well as teh work of diverse figures such as Aristotle, John Dewey, Donna Haraway adn Maria Lugones. A fascinating feature of the book is the use of the metaphor of the cyborg to highlight the fluidity of the nature/culture distinction and how this can enrich econfeminist ethics and politics. An outstanding new argument for an ecological feminism that links both theory and practice, Feminism and Ecological Communities bravely redraws the ecofeminist map. It will be essential reading for all those interested in gender studies, environmental studies and philosophy. (shrink)

Aristotle believes that an agent lacks virtue unless she enjoys the performance of virtuous actions, while Kant claims that the person who does her duty despite contrary inclinations exhibits a moral worth that the person who acts from inclination lacks. Despite these differences, this chapter argues that Aristotle and Kant share a distinctive view of the object of human choice and locus of moral value: that what we choose, and what has moral value, are not mere acts, but actions: acts (...) done for the sake of ends. Morally good actions embody a kind of intrinsic value that inspires us to do them from duty (in Kant) or for the sake of the noble (in Aristotle). The chapter traces the difference in their attitudes about doing one's duty with pleasure to a difference in their attitudes towards pleasure itself: Aristotle sees it as a perception of the good, while Kant thinks of it as mere feeling. (shrink)

This book should be essential reading for anyone interested in the new reproductive technologies, biomedical ethics, and women's health.

This chapter argues that the standard epistemological requirements of impartiality on the part of the knower, and passivity on the part of the thing under investigation, exclude from the purview of epistemology a very important kind of knowledge, namely: knowledge of persons. Feminist philosophers have focused on problems in explaining knowledge of other persons, but the same considerations require a reorientation in the way we think of knowledge of oneself. Because of the subjectivity of the knower and reflexive nature of (...) the investigation involving self-knowledge, one's inquiry is affected in a way that challenges the accuracy of what is learned. The chapter's response is to treat the procedural methods used to obtain knowledge of oneself as continuous with the methods of acquiring knowledge of other persons via knowing their moral and cognitive characters. It highlights the intersection between virtue ethics and virtue epistemology. (shrink)

Nursing and bioethics have a lot in common because they share concerns about life and death, illness and health, the rights of individuals and communities, ethical patient care, health care delivery, and public health. Nurses and bioethicists contribute to ethical practice, ethics scholarship, and health policy‐making in a variety of ways. Some nurses have bioethics education or experience, some bioethicists study or collaborate closely with nurses, and some of us proudly identify as both bioethicists and as nurses. Despite certain shared (...) and interwoven aims, bioethicists and nurses often accomplish their goals in dissimilar ways, have diverse educational and training trajectories as well as distinct roles and responsibilities, and are viewed differently within health care organizations. Yet the work of bioethics and nursing can be, and in my view should more often be, synergistic. That synergism may be especially critical in the arena of health policy and ethics. Nurses can bring extraordinary insights and real‐world experiences to the policy table but are not always considered essential contributors. (shrink)

... View (i) The Thesis of Essential Contestedness The view that freedom and other ideals such as justice are essentially contested is important, ...

Controversy persists over the ethics of compensating research participants and providing posttrial benefits to communities in developing countries. Little is known about residents' views on these subjects. In this study, interviews about compensation and posttrial benefits from a hypothetical HIV vaccine trial were conducted in Uganda’s Rakai District. Most respondents said researchers owed the community posttrial benefits and research compensation, but opinions differed as to what these should be. Debates about posttrial benefits and compensation rarely include residents' views like these, (...) but future ones should. (shrink)

As highlighted by Pavarini et al., researchers in the field of bioethics have to remain critical and reflexive on the methodology and on the tools they use for their research purpose because...

RésuméJ'ai soutenu dans un article de 1985 que s'il y avait des miracles, cela parlerait contre l'existence du Dieu judéo-chrétien. Dans son livre de 1988 sur le concept de miracle, Robert Larmer propose une critique de mes arguments. J'évalue ici la force de cette critique. Je montre que la redéfinition de «miracle» que propose Larmer est circulaire; que sa distinction est spécieuse entre violer une hi naturelle et la surmonter grâce à la création ou la destruction d'énergie par Dieu; et (...) que sa tentative de montrer que les miracles sont le produit d'un être rationnel, bienfaisant et tout-puissant est inadéquate. (shrink)

Agents can be insincere in many different ways. They can utter claims they take to be false, or they can utter true claims with an intention to deceive their audiences. While both liars and virtual liars are committed truth-seekers, they are poor truth-sharers. Agents can also deceive about their reasons for holding the true beliefs that they hold: cheaters and plagiarists deceive about the justifications of their true beliefs, and they intentionally exploit our normative practices of evaluating cognitive agents. Agents (...) can also be insincere about their commitment to truth-seeking enterprises. They may pose as serious truth-seekers and earnest truth-sharers, but they are what Frankfurt identifies as bullshitters: they do not care whether what they say is true. In this paper, I examine these different ways of deceiving others, and I assess Frankfurt’s charge that bullshit is worse than lies. (shrink)

The study of synaesthesia has moved from single case studies to group comparisons over the last decades. These endeavours have brought about detailed knowledge on the phenomenology of synaesthesia across its range of different variants, and have provided numerous cognitive behavioural paradigms with which to test for "genuine" synaesthesia. Researchers have begun to group synaesthetes into ever more sub-groups depending on i) which senses are affected and ii) the way synaesthesia is experienced. In the latter case, an influential distinction concerns (...) the separation of synaesthetes into projector and associator synaesthetes. Subsequent studies reported inconsistencies with which individuals described their purportedly associated versus projected status. For example, some synaesthetes categorised themselves in different ways when asked on two different occasions. This inconsistency may not reflect an unstable synaesthetic experience, but rather, a problem with methodology, because synaesthetes are often asked to verbalise what is essentially a visual phenomenon. We argue that illustrations are a superior means to properly demonstrate individual differences in the synaesthetic experience. This argument is based on a recent study in which participants were more reliably categorized into projector and associator categories when using an illustrated, rather than a purely verbal synaesthesia questionnaire. After reporting these study details, we conclude that future studies testing individual differences in synaesthesia should use illustrations when inquiring about the subjective synaesthetic experience of their participants. (shrink)

Numerous studies show that humans tend to be more cooperative than expected given the assumption that they are rational maximizers of personal gain. As a result, theoreticians have proposed elaborated formal representations of human decision-making, in which utility functions including “altruistic” or “moral” preferences replace the purely self-oriented "Homo economicus" function. Here we review mathematical approaches that provide insights into the mathematical stability of alternative ways of representing human decision-making in social contexts. Candidate utility functions may be evaluated with help (...) of game theory, classical modeling of social evolution that focuses on behavioral strategies, and modeling of social evolution that focuses directly on utility functions. We present the advantages of the latter form of investigation and discuss one surprisingly precise result: “Homo economicus” as well as “altruistic” utility functions are less stable than a function containing a preference for the golden rule or for the common welfare that is only expressed in social contexts composed of individuals with similar preferences. We discuss the contribution of mathematical models to our understanding of human other-oriented behavior, with a focus on the classical debate over psychological altruism. We conclude that human can be psychologically altruistic, but that psychological altruism evolved because it was generally expressed towards individuals that contributed to the actor’s fitness, such as own children, romantic partners and long term reciprocators. (shrink)

As this article is published, Robert Larmer and I have been engaged in a debate that is now eighteen years long, often with gaps of many years between ripostes, about the nature and significance of miracles. The Larmer/overall oeuvre now includes six works, including the two published here. I am grateful to the editors of Dialogue for giving me the opportunity to respond to Larmer’s most recent entry in the debate.

This article focuses on the representation of youth as a key moment of transition in contemporary western societies, set between the dependent state of childhood and the supposed maturity and independence of adult status. Young people are viewed as gendered, racialized and sexualized beings who also occupy specific class locations, and are assumed to move through crucial points of transition as they leave full-time education and enter the job market, as well as the (hetero)sexual and marriage marketplaces. The article examines (...) some of the main discursive configurations and treatment regimes through which ‘troubled teens’ are constructed and managed, especially in relation to notions about disordered patterns of consumption and transition. The paper considers the moment of the ‘discovery’ of adolescence in the late nineteenth century, going on to examine young women's particular relationships to discourses around consumption in the contemporary British youth research literature, and to debates about ‘disrupted transitions’ and citizenship in the 1990s. The article ends with a brief examination of one approach to the ‘problem of troubled teens’ in the USA: Specialty Schools that offer a combination of educational, therapeutic and correctional regimes aimed at young people who have been identified in relation to various disorders of transition and consumption. (shrink)

Consideration of affective dimensions beyond arousal may be useful for a more precise understanding of the effects of emotional events on episodic memory. As highlighted by Kensinger (2009), the valence of an event may differentially impact the accuracy of its recall. Paralleling work on attention, we propose that the relevance of an event or stimulus for survival may also importantly modulate memory accuracy. However, few memory studies to date have accounted for motivational relevance, and the stimuli employed in most studies (...) are not matched on this dimension. (shrink)

« Je t’aime moi non plus », le titre de la fameuse chanson de Gainsbourg reflète de manière exquise ce que la vie a de beau et d’amer à la fois. A défaut de traiter d’amour, cet ouvrage analyse les méandres de l’aide à sens unique. L’altruisme, ce comportement de don sans attente de retour de service, est abordé ici de manière scientifique et philosophique plutôt que poétique et littéraire. Un objectif est d’en traquer les mécanismes sous-jacents, ceux qui échappent (...) à tout romantisme et se traduisent souvent en calculs de coûts et bénéfices. Il s’agit également d’approfondir les diverses manières de comprendre et de pratiquer l’altruisme. Souvent considéré comme une des plus grandes vertus humaines, l’objet de nombreux écrits philosophiques et psychologiques, l’altruisme peut-il se trouver chez les abeilles et les marmottes ? Posez la question à un biologiste de l’évolution et il vous répondra « Mais oui, évidemment ! ». A première vue, une telle réponse est consternante mais nous verrons qu’à y regarder de plus près, les philosophes et les biologistes ne parlent pas exactement de la même chose en utilisant le même terme. L’hétérogénéité des disciplines intéressées à l’altruisme et des contextes théoriques dans lesquels il est utilisé en ont fait une notion extrêmement complexe et difficile à saisir. Au sein des différentes sciences sociales et du vivant, l’altruisme est un élément pivot dans trois débats dont cet ouvrage prend le temps de retracer les contours. Tantôt, l’altruisme se profile en danger (apparent) pour la théorie de l’évolution darwinienne (chap. 1), tantôt, il sert de cheval de bataille dans la croisade contre l’idéal de l’homo economicus si souvent prôné en économie (chap. 2 et 3), tantôt il est une énigme à découvrir dans les méandres de nos motivations intimes (chap. 3). Dans le cadre de ces différents débats, la notion d’altruisme prend des significations sensiblement différentes. Pour en rendre compte, l’ensemble de l’ouvrage s’articule autour d’une triple distinction fondamentale : l’altruisme peut être compris au sens biologique, comportemental ou psychologique. Chacune de ces notions est utilisée dans un contexte spécifique au sein de sciences qui ont leurs propres traditions et leurs propres débats internes. La structure de l’ouvrage est organisée en fonction de cette triple distinction. Le premier chapitre est consacré à l’altruisme biologique, définit en termes de valeur de survie et de reproduction (fitness) : un comportement est altruiste s’il a pour effet d’augmenter la fitness d’autrui aux dépens de sa propre fitness. L’observation de comportements altruistes au sein du monde animal a posé un des plus grands défis à la théorie de l’évolution depuis la publication de l’Origine des espèces. Des générations de biologistes se sont attelés à la tâche d’expliquer comment un comportement qui augmente la fitness biologique d’autres organismes aux dépends de la fitness de l’agent a pu être sélectionnée au fil de l’évolution. Nous verrons que c’est grâce aux travaux de William Hamilton et d’autres que cette difficulté a pu être résolue. Le deuxième chapitre retrace les attaques d’une frange d’économistes (supportés dans leur effort critique par des théoriciens des jeux et anthropologues évolutionnistes), contre le modèle classique de l’homo economicus. Leur objectif est de montrer que des personnes ordinaires ne se comportement souvent pas en maximisateurs rationnels de leurs gains propres, comme le prédirait la théorie économique néo-classique. Dans le cadre de ce débat, c’est du comportement social spécifiquement humain et plus particulièrement de l’altruisme humain dont il est question. Le terme d’altruisme est alors utilisé dans un sens plus lâche que ne le font les biologistes ; ce que l’on appellera l’altruisme comportemental comprend les actions coûteuses pour l’agent et avantageuses pour autrui. La particularité humaine fournira également l’occasion de traiter la délicate question des rapports entre l’évolution génétique et la culture. Nous verrons que l’étude du comportement animal fournit les premiers éléments d’explication de l’altruisme humain, mais ce dernier ne peut être pleinement compris qu’au terme d’une analyse qui tient compte des capacités qui nous sont propres. Cette analyse nous permettra de saisir pourquoi les êtes humains sont à la fois plus sociaux et plus opportunistes (la contradiction n’est qu’apparente) que les autres espèces animales. Malgré leurs différences, les versions biologique et comportementale de l’altruisme sont très proches au sens où elles traitent des conséquences de comportements. Ces notions ne reflètent qu’imparfaitement la conception ordinaire que nous nous faisons de l’altruisme. L’altruisme tel qu’il est utilisé dans le langage courant correspond davantage à l’image que s’en font les philosophes et les psychologues. Pour déceler les actions altruistes, ces derniers se demandent généralement si elles ont été causées par un motif dirigé vers le bien d’autrui. En ce sens, on parle d’altruisme psychologique qui réfère aux causes plutôt qu’aux effets des actions d’aide. Le troisième chapitre est consacré aux débats qui font rage autour de la question de savoir si les êtres humains sont capables d’agir de manière altruiste psychologique, c’est-à-dire en fonction de motifs exclusivement dirigés vers le bien-être d’autrui. Nous verrons à quel point cette tâche est ardue à moins d’accepter de reformuler la question en termes de motivation primaire à l’action. Au terme de l’analyse, il apparaitra que les trois notions d’altruisme se croisent sans se recouper dans un enchevêtrement de liens plus ou moins complexes. Nous verrons par exemple que l’altruisme biologique (voire comportemental) pourrait bien être une condition nécessaire à l’évolution de l’altruisme psychologique ; des liens tangibles peut ainsi être tissés entre ces différentes notions. Les diverses approches du phénomène de l’altruisme retracées dans cet ouvrage fournissent également des clefs de compréhension des méandres du comportement social animal et plus particulièrement humain. De manière générale, sans apporter de solutions toutes faites, cet écrit peut servir de guide sémantique et initie le lecteur à une littérature interdisciplinaire émergeante, foisonnante, passionnante quoique encore souvent parsemée de confusions et de contradictions. (shrink)

ago that thinking (along with speaking and acting) “like a woman” was taken as a matter of shame and weakness. The phrase remains an insult to any man who is accused of being “like a woman” in any respect. But the only reason the phrase ...

The allocation of any scarce health care resource, especially a lifesaving resource, can create profound ethical and legal challenges. Liver transplant allocation currently is based upon urgency, a sickest-first approach, and does not utilize capacity to benefit. While urgency can be described reasonably well with the MELD system, benefit encompasses multiple dimensions of patients’ well-being. Currently, the balance between both principles is ill-defined. This survey with 502 participants examines how urgency and benefit are weighted by different stakeholders. Liver transplant patients (...) favored the sickest-first allocation, although all other groups tended to favor benefit. Criteria of a successful transplantation were a minimum survival of at least 1 year and recovery of functional status to being ambulatory and capable of all self-care. An individual delisting decision was accepted when the 1-year survival probability would fall below 50%. Benefit was found to be a critical variable that may also trigger the willingness to donate organs. The strong interest of stakeholder for successful liver transplants is inadequately translated into current allocation rules. (shrink)

A critical review of John Cottingham's "Philosophy and the Good Life: Reason and the Passions in Greek, cartesian, and psychoanalytic ethics" Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998.

Because of the two crucial problems just described, it is concluded that Stace's theory of the nature of mystical experience is inadequate. An alternative approach is outlined, which obviates the weaknesses in Stace's theory by combining C. J. Ducasse's distinction between connate and alien accusatives, with the suggestion by Gilbert Ryle and David Hamlyn that experiencing is like the exercise of a skill. Mystical experience, it is then proposed, is the exercise of the difficult yet rewarding acquired skill of experiencing (...) unitively. ;The second problem concerns the relation between the mystical experience and the interpretation made of it by the mystic. On this topic Stace is found to support two distinct positions: first, that experience or the given in general is independent of mental activity, and that mystical experience is pure, that is, uninterpreted; second, that pure experience is "psychologically impossible," and that no uninterpreted mystical experiences occur. Without passing judgment upon the issue of "psychological impossibility," an argument is here advanced to show that all mystical experiences reflect the specific context in which they occur, and hence that, in Stace's sense, all such experiences are "impure." ;In the evaluation of Stace's views about the nature of mystical experience, two main problems emerge. The first of these concerns the relation between the mystical experience and its object. Stace contends that mystical experience is identical with its object, the "Universal Self." However, his arguments for this belief, founded upon his general theory of experience and upon his examination of reports of mystical experiences, are demonstrated to be unsuccessful. ;The philosophical context of Stace's views on mystical experience includes, it is shown, Stace's many studies of mysticism in addition to his major survey of the field, Mysticism and Philosophy. It also embraces his more general writings about the concept of the given, the structure of human knowledge, and what Stace calls "phenomenalist metaphysics." ;A foundational element of Walter Terence Stace's pioneer work in the philosophy of mysticism is his theory of the nature of mystical experience. Accordingly, this thesis has two purposes: to outline the context of Stace's views on mystical experience; and to evaluate Stace's views on the nature of mystical experience. (shrink)

This volume examines works of the early Frankfurt School that are concerned with gender identities, institutions, and ideologies, as well as the ongoing relevance of early Frankfurt School ideas for contemporary feminist analyses of gender, sex, and sexuality.

In seventeenth- and eighteenth-century London and Paris, growing numbers of poor alarmed notables and city officials who would come to view a policy of confinement as an appropriate social, economic, religious, and political solution. This work examines the motivations of patrons to support these institutions (called hospitals). In particular, this study looks at their support for the construction (or renovations) of chapels (e.g. chapel at La Salpêtrière and the chapel at the Lock Hospital) and their visitations to these hospitals. Vagrants, (...) beggars, prostitutes, and idlers of other sorts healthy or not were confined not necessarily for theirhealth but for their souls and for the social order of the city. The locations of these hospitals indicate a geographical isolation not only in their “placement” outside the city walls but even in the Christian charitable rhetoric or visitations by benefactors that emphasized their separateness. “Unclean livers” or destitute beggars were put on view so that the morally upright who patronized these institutions could view for instructional purposes and could be viewed for purposes of salvation, but remained as separate nonetheless. Great masses and grand sermons were heard in the chapels that adorned these institutions, but a clear policy of segregation existed that kept the godly patrons separate from the “polluted.”. (shrink)

In this paper, I am concerned to show that a wide and interesting range of phenomena commonly described as ‘weakness of will’ should be understood as manifesting a defect of what I shall call ‘executive cowardice’ rather than a strong kind of irrationality. More specifically, I claim that such cases should not be understood as an irrational bypassing of an all-things-considered judgment about the thing to do—a view succinctly described by Peacocke thus: The akrates is irrational because although he intentionally (...) does something for which he has some reason, there is a wider set of reasons he has relative to which he does not judge what he does to be rational. (shrink)